

**CSAP IAS ACADEMY**

# **INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

— SMARTBOOK —



**COMPREHENSIVE AND  
CONCISE NOTES FOR  
GOVERNANCE**

## TABLE OF CONTENT

<b>Chapter no.</b>	<b>Chapter name</b>	<b>Page no.</b>
1.	INDIA AND IT'S NEIGHBOURHOOD	1-14
2.	INDIA BANGLADESH RELATIONS	14-21
3.	INDIA-BHUTAN RELATIONS	22-24
4.	INDIA AND NEPAL RELATIONS	25-28
5.	THE BBIN FRAMEWORK	28-30
6.	INDIA SHRI-LANKA RELATIONS	30-34
7.	INDIA-MALDIVES RELATIONS	35-39
8.	INDIA PAKISTAN RELATIONS	40-50
9.	INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS	51-53
10.	INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS	52-66
11.	INDIA-MYANMAR RELATIONS	66-72
12.	INDIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA	73-76
13.	INDIA- SINGAPORE RELATIONS	76-77
14.	INDIA AND VIETNAM RELATIONS	78-80
15.	INDIA AND WEST ASIA	80-83
16.	INDIA AND SAUDI ARABIA RELATIONS	84-88
17.	INDIA AND UAE RELATIONS	89-94
18.	INDIA-ISRAEL RELATIONS	94-100
19.	INDIA AND PALESTINE RELATIONS	100-103
20.	INDIA AND RUSSIA RELATIONS	103-108
21.	INDIA-FRANCE RELATIONS	108-112
22.	INDIA- GERMANY RELATIONS	112-117
23.	INDIA-AFRICA RELATIONS	118-121
24.	INDIA – USA RELATIONS	122-129
25.	INDIA - UNITED KINGDOM RELATIONS	130-134
26.	INDIA-LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS	135-137
27.	INDIA-EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS	138-142
28.	INDIA-ITALY RELATIONS	143-147
29.	ORGANISATIONS, GROUPINGS AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	148-233
30.	MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS	233-236

## Chapter 1

### INDIA AND IT'S NEIGHBOURHOOD


India's foreign policy places a high priority on its neighbours since it is well aware that a peaceful India needs the periphery to accomplish its many developmental objectives. But the dynamics of India's neighbourhood are complicated, with many of the countries experiencing high rates of inflation, unstable economies, and social upheaval. Geographical necessity ties neighbours, making regional collaboration essential since problems encountered by those outside the border have a great potential to spread inside.

The concept of India's neighborhood is subject to geopolitical interpretation and can differ depending on historical, political, economic, and security factors, regardless of the lack of a single, widely recognized definition.

#### **India's neighbourhood includes:**

Immediate neighbours or countries in the South Asian Region with which India shares its geographical land/maritime boundaries. These include countries like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

India has shared history, culture, and interpersonal interactions with these nations, resulting in civilizational linkages. Since independence, India's "**first circle of priority**" has been its immediate neighbours, provided that they continue to be mindful of India's fundamental security concerns.



Extended neighbours or countries geographically

located further away from India (such as in the Indian Ocean Region, South-east Asia region or West Asian region) but still have significant political, economic, cultural and strategic interactions with India.

#### **Evolution of India's Foreign Policy:**

##### **I. 1947-1962: Internationalist, Idealist and Non-Aligned India**

Independent India's foreign policy was the result of multiple factors such as the legacy of national movement against the British rule, post-Second World War developments, domestic needs and personalities such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Even the Indian constitution included a provision, under article 51, for promotion of international peace and security, wherein the state shall Endeavour to:

- (a) Promote international peace and security;
- (b) Maintain just and honourable relations between nations;
- (c) Foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another; and
- (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration



The formative influence of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru is the feature of initial years of foreign policy of India which left a long-lasting impact and polarised opinions for years to come. His vision included special status of India given its history, size and potential. It was a foreign policy predicated on internationalism, Afro-Asian Solidarity, anti-colonialism and non-alignment in the era of cold war power politics dominated by the two superpowers i.e. the USA and the USSR.

Even before India became Independent the Asian relations Conference was held in New Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947. Mr. Nehru observed “we stand at the end of an era and on the threshold of a new period of history... Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has suddenly become important again in world affairs”.

India was the first to suggest plebiscite as a peaceful method for resolving the Junagadh dispute with Pakistan. India made a similar offer for settling the Kashmir situation in 1947. The referral of Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir to the United Nations in December 1947 is seen by many as a mistake on the part of India's leadership in reposing its trust in international organisation such as the UN. According to J. Bandopadhyay Nehru's attempt to combine both idealism and realism in his policy towards Kashmir affected certain aspects of the Kashmir diplomacy, and it would “conceivably have been different if dealt by someone else”.

However, according to Rajiv Sikri, Nehru “was ready to take the war to Pakistan in 1948 when things were getting difficult in Jammu and Kashmir but was overruled by his British army chief. He took the Kashmir question to the United Nations under pressure from the British Governor General of India.”

Nonetheless, this initial experience at the UN further cemented scepticism towards the western world in India's foreign policy. The result was a quest for charting a new path that involved newly independent countries of Asia and Africa and equidistance from the power politics of the day. In this phase three key features characterized India's foreign policy conduct. First, India played a significant role in multilateral institutions and particularly in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Second, it also emerged as a critical proponent of the nonaligned movement. Third, as a leader of the nonaligned movement it also made a significant contribution toward the process of decolonization. India's in international participation was most visible in:

1. International Control Commission in Vietnam along with Canada and Poland (1954),
2. Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea (1952-54)

3. United Nations Peacekeeping forces in the Belgian Congo (1960-1964)

India's activism in this phase also reflected in the arena of disarmament, specifically the nuclear weapons. As one of the early proponents of a nuclear test ban treaty, in 1952 India introduced a draft resolution co-sponsored with Ireland to bring about a global ban on nuclear tests.

## **II. Panchsheel:**

In this period the approach towards foreign relations was further underlined by the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, known as the Panchsheel Treaty between China and India in 1954. They were enunciated in the preamble to the "Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India", which was signed at Peking on 29 April 1954. This agreement stated the five principles as:

- Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- Mutual non-aggression.
- Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
- Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit.
- Peaceful co-existence.



Internationalist, approach of foreign policy was also reflected in the active participation of India at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung (Indonesia) 1955. This Conference was held in Bandung on April 18-24, 1955 and gathered 29 Heads of States belonging to the first post- colonial generation of leaders from the two continents with the aim of identifying and assessing world issues at the time and pursuing out joint policies in international

relations. The principles that would govern relations among large and small nations, known as the "Ten Principles of Bandung", were proclaimed at that Conference. The Bandung conference paved way for the creation of the Movement of Non-Aligned nations in 1961.

The Indus Water Treaty signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 by Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru and President of Pakistan Ayub Khan, was a testimony to progress made on contentious issues through diplomatic means. However, even though India professed diplomacy as the preferred choice to resolve disputes, it took certain stringent actions when required. For instance, when extensive diplomatic discussion with the stubborn Salazar regime in Portugal produced a deadlock and Prime Minister Nehru faced increasing criticism from a group of Afro-Asian leaders, India chose to use force to oust the Portuguese from their colonial enclave in Goa in 1961.



### III. Setback with China:

1962 One of the key elements of a foreign policy based on the idea of nonalignment was the limitation of high defence expenditures. Such a policy weakened the hard power capabilities of India. It was tested most acutely in its relations with People's Republic of China (PRC). India gave refuge to the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama in 1959 and negotiations with the PRC reached a dead end in 1960. Consequently, India adopted, in the words of Sumit Ganguly, a **“strategy of compellence designed to restore what it deemed to be the territorial status quo along the disputed Himalayan border”**. It involved sending in lightly armed, poorly equipped and ill prepared troops to high altitudes without adequate supply lines. This policy, however, was proved to be ill conceived.

When in 1962 the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC invaded India with extensive force, the Indian military was unprepared to face the assault. The PLA inflicted considerable losses on the Indian forces and then withdrew from some of the areas that they had entered. However, they did not vacate Axai Chin, an area of more than 14,000 square miles, that they had initially claimed and it remains a bone of contention in India's relation with China.



### IV. A brief overview of the Non-Aligned Movement:

Six years after Bandung, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries was founded on a wider geographical basis at the First Summit Conference of Belgrade, which was held on September 1-6, 1961. **The Conference was attended by 25 countries:** Afghanistan, Algeria, Yemen, Myanmar, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia.



In 1960, in the light of the results achieved in Bandung, the creation of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries was given boost during the

Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the United Nations General Assembly, during which 17 new African and Asian countries were admitted to the UN. A key role was played in this process by the then Heads of State and Government Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, who later became the founding fathers of the movement and its emblematic leaders.

The Bandung Principles were adopted later as the main goals and objectives of the policy of non-alignment. The fulfilment of those principles became the essential criterion for Non-aligned Movement membership; it is what was known as the "quintessence of the Movement" until the early 1990s.

The Founders of NAM have preferred to declare it as a movement but not an organization in order to avoid bureaucratic implications of the latter.

**Primary of objectives of the non-aligned countries focused on:**

1. the support of self-determination, national independence and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States;
2. opposition to apartheid;
3. non-adherence to multilateral military pacts and the independence of non-aligned countries from great power or block influences and rivalries;
4. the struggle against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations;
4. the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, foreign occupation and domination;
5. disarmament;
6. non-interference into the internal affairs of States and peaceful coexistence among all nations;
7. rejection of the use or threat of use of force in international relations;
8. the strengthening of the United Nations; the democratization of international relations;
9. Socioeconomic development and the restructuring of the international economic system; as well as international cooperation on an equal footing.

**V. The Chinese Nuclear Test and After:**

Following the Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor in 1964, arguments were made in the parliament called for an abandonment of nonalignment and even urged that India acquire an independent nuclear weapons option. Prime Minister Shastri privately explored the possibility of help from the United States for nuclear security. More importantly he declared India would not make nuclear weapons of its own. In 1966, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who succeeded Mr. Shastri, also decided to seek a nuclear guarantee from the great powers. This effort, however, brought no success. Hence, Prime Minister Gandhi authorized India's Subterranean Nuclear Explosions Project (SNEP) which led to India's first nuclear test of May 1974.



It is important to note that India had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) which came into existence in 1963. It was perhaps in the hope that the treaty would lead to further nuclear disarmament. However, these hopes remained hopes only. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which opened for signature in 1968 represented the inequities of global order. India opposed the treaty citing norms of sovereign equality, at the same time the potential constraints of NPT on its own nuclear options was a key consideration.

**VI. The Simla Agreement:**

In the aftermath of the war India adopted a magnanimous gesture as reflected in repatriation of more than 91,000 PoWs of Pakistan and the Simla Agreement signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan on 2 July 1972. It was much more than a peace treaty seeking to reverse the consequences of the 1971 war. It was a comprehensive blue print for good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. The following principles of the Agreement are, however, particularly noteworthy.

- A mutual commitment to the peaceful resolution of all issues through direct bilateral approaches.
- To build the foundations of a cooperative relationship with special focus on people-to-people contacts.
- To uphold the inviolability of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, this is a most important CBM between India and Pakistan, and a key to durable peace.



Thus, even though on the face of it the agreement is criticised by many a lost opportunity, it established the framework that India has continuously put forward as a template to resolve all disputes within a bilateral framework.

A better understanding of the period requires appreciation of the fact that in July 1971, President Nixon's National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger secretly visited Beijing during a trip to Pakistan, and laid the groundwork for Nixon's visit to China in 1972. This was in the aftermath of a Sino-Soviet rift. Ultimately PRC entered the UN and assumed the seat in the Security Council in October 1971.

In the larger international economic context, India remained at the forefront of the Group of 77, a group established in 1964 comprising of developing nations seeking fundamental changes in the global economic order. Furthermore, the 1973 oil crisis in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war in the same year

placed an economic challenge before India. However, even as the leader of the developing countries India failed to obtain any meaningful concessions as a resource-poor developing nation from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It was weakness in the economic capacity that prevented India from pursuing a nuclear weapons program even after it 1974.

The mid-1970s saw India undergoing a period of political turmoil involving emergency and the emergence of the Janata Party government in 1977 under Prime Minister Morarji Desai. The brief period of the Desai government saw many pronouncements about altering the course of India including a move to “genuine non-alignment. However, this period was a brief interlude and marked by much continuity in India's foreign policy. The visit of Minister of External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China and the US president Jimmy Carter to India were key developments of this period.

Events in the cold war dominated world in this period had a long-lasting impact on India. In this context the year 1979 is important as three key developments proved that national interests of India were subject to developments outside. Firstly, in February 1979 the revolution in Iran brought fundamental changes in West Asian region. Secondly, the during November and December the events surrounding the seizure of Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia brought further upheaval in a region key to India. Thirdly, in December Soviet Union invaded USSR in Afghanistan. While the consequences of first two events had an impact on India in the long term, it's the Soviet entry into Afghanistan that set-in motion factors that had important consequences in terms of India's neighborhood specifically Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The United States renewed strategic relationship with Pakistan in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. Under General Zia-Ul-Haq Pakistan became the frontline in the US efforts to bog down the Soviets in Afghanistan. This entailed enhanced funding and military aid to Pakistan to be channelled in Afghanistan against the soviets through the Afghan fighters. As a consequence, with the objective of maintaining its military

superiority over Pakistan, India entered into a closer military cooperation relationship with the Soviet Union. However, this perhaps dented the nonaligned credentials of India as it was forced to maintain an ambiguous stance on Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, the Seventh NAM summit in March 1983 at New Delhi became an occasion for assuming leadership of the multilateral forum of which India was a founding member. However, by this time the membership of the group had grown to nearly a 100 as compared to 25 at its first Summit in Belgrade in 1961. As astutely observed in one of the media reports of the era, “paradoxically, NAM has attained a spatial expansion that would have astonished its founding fathers, including Jawaharlal Nehru; at the same time, it has lost its cohesion and unity of objectives and purposes, and is unable to cope with the critical problems and issues that cry out for urgent solutions.”

The assassination of PM Indira Gandhi in 1984 was followed by a transition to the tenure of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. In this period India undertook some steps towards modernisation of the economy and armed forces. In 1988 Rajiv Gandhi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit China since 1954 and establishing contacts with Deng Xiaoping under whom China had ushered in new era of economic reforms. The initiative for regional cooperation materialised in the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985. This period also saw greater involvement in the neighborhood including the signing of an agreement with Pakistan on not attacking each other nuclear installations, a visit followed in 1989 making it first visit of any Indian Prime Minister after Nehru’s visit in 1960. The India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord in 1987 and subsequent decision to send Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka had long lasting impact in the region. India’s assertion in the neighbourhood was further highlighted by “Operation Cactus” that involved military action against the coup in Maldives in 1988.

At the end of this period India experienced greater political and economic instability such as the Bofors scandal, short lived coalition governments of Prime Ministers V.P. Singh and Chandrasekhar as well as the balance of payment crisis. These developments

accompanied by changes in the international environment led to the next phase in India’s foreign policy.

### **Non-Alignment: Relevance of the Idea and the Movement**

Started in 1961, NAM now has 120 members. The countries of the Non-Aligned Movement represent nearly two-thirds of the membership of the United Nations and 55% of the world population. In the Cold war period, its aim was to ensure "the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries" and "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics. In the years since the Cold War's end, it has focused on developing multilateral ties and connections as well as unity among the developing nations of the world, especially those within the Global South.

In contemporary times the questions on the relevance of NAM acquired salience since the end of Cold war. The 17th Summit of the NAM held in September 2016 in Margarita, Venezuela, was marked by the absence of representation at the head of government level from India. This had happened only once before i.e. in 1979 when the then caretaker Prime Minister Mr. Charan Singh could not participate in the Havana Summit of the NAM. Many view this as the distancing of India from NAM.

### **I. Arguments in the Context of Irrelevance of NAM**

NAM has been pronounced irrelevant increasingly since the end of Cold War and especially since the advent of the 21st century. In 2007 the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice advised India to “move past old ways of thinking” as the Non-Aligned Movement had lost its meaning. Ever since the inception of NAM some commentators had felt that the:

- Word ‘non-alignment’ conveyed the wrong notion of neutrality and it only aimed at remaining unaligned.
- Many argue that NAM did not have any binding principles and that it was a marriage of convenience among disparate countries. This



criticism gained significance as the membership of NAM grew over the years.

- Another argument in this context is that NAM countries did not come forward on any of the critical occasions when India needed solidarity, such as the Chinese aggression in 1962 or the Bangladesh war in 1971.
- After the end of Cold war many argued that there was no basis of non-alignment after the end of Superpower rivalry.

## **II. Arguments in Defence of NAM and Non-Alignment**

In response to Condoleezza Rice's statement, then Minister of External Affairs Mr. Pranab Mukherji reminded her that NAM played an important role on the issues such as decolonisation and its relevance in South-South cooperation cannot be written off in the contemporary world.

- Many others such as former diplomat T.P. Sreenivasan, argue that the quintessence of non-alignment was freedom of judgment and action and it remained valid, whether there was one bloc or two.
- He also argues that seen in this context, non-military alliances can also be within the ambit of non-alignment, which was subsequently characterised as 'strategic autonomy'. In other words, India does not have to denounce non-alignment to follow its present foreign policy.
- In response to lack of help on crucial, juncture Mr. Sreenivasan argued that the whole philosophy of NAM is that it remains united on larger global issues, even if does not side with a member on a specific issue. India itself has followed this approach, whenever the members had problems with others either inside or outside the movement.
- Historical genesis of the doctrine of non-alignment in India can be traced to domestic context, which further led to India spearheading the Non-Aligned Movement in the international sphere. Sumit Ganguly provides an informed assessment, he argues that:

Under Nehru, India followed an ideational foreign policy which involved multilateral institutions, constraints on defence spending, and advocacy of decolonisation. These goals became embodied in the doctrine of non-alignment.

The policy was also in keeping with India's national experience of colonialism. As a former colonized state India was wary of limiting its foreign policy options through an alignment with either Superpower.

Ideas embodied in the doctrine of non-alignment were in keeping with India's historical and cultural legacies.

The moral stance of nonalignment against colonization and apartheid neatly dovetailed with India's Gandhian heritage.

At the international level, the policy made sense as it enabled a materially weak state to play a role that was considerably more significant than its capabilities would allow it to be. Furthermore, the NAM in the 1970s and 1980s, it can be argued, served as a forum to channel India's views on many global issues such as:

- India's deep dissatisfaction with the international order characterised as it was by economic, political, and nuclear hierarchies.
- It was through NAM that India articulated the call for a new international economic order that would cater for the special needs of the developing countries.
- Similarly, it was through NAM that India articulated the call for a new world information and communication order to provide a greater voice for developing countries in global communications.
- NAM also served as a forum for India to articulate its views on global nuclear disarmament and the discriminatory nature of the global nuclear order at the centre of which stood the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

### **A Contemporary Assessment**

At the very outset one has to distinguish between the idea of non-alignment and the membership of Non-Aligned movement.

In the opinion of David M. Malone, "Non-alignment, in theory...allowed India to play the two superpowers and their related blocs off against each other, although after the 1950s, India was not successful in doing so." He also argues that "the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that Nehru played such a large role in bringing about and shaping was

a useful placeholder for India at a time when its leaders needed to devote the bulk of their time to pressing internal challenges.”

In the opinion of former diplomat Rajiv Sikri: Non-alignment as a policy option for India, as distinct from the Non-Aligned Movement, was essentially about resisting pressures to join rival camps during the Cold War and about examining foreign policy options on merit. In short, it was about having an independent foreign policy. This national consensus remains very strong in India, and has nothing to do with the so-called ‘Cold War mentality’ as many analysts derisively claim. Similarly, many like former diplomat G. Parthasarthy emphasize on drawing a distinction between being “non-aligned” and being a member of the “Non-Aligned Movement”, in contemporary times. In his words “non-alignment in the post Cold War era is still relevant and really means the freedom to choose a wide range of partners to cooperate with on different issues, to protect our national interests. Thus, while being non-aligned gives us the flexibility to choose our partners and partnerships, the Non-Aligned Movement is a forum of little relevance in today’s world.” As rightly pointed out by put by Shyam Saran, Non-Aligned Movement is not what determined India’s non alignment; rather it is India’s non alignment that facilitated the functioning of the movement.

Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, India has become a key member of various multilateral groupings:

- BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) for protecting and promoting its interests on climate change;
- G4 for pushing through reforms of the UN Security Council;
- G20 for managing the world economy;
- BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) to enhance economic coordination with countries that are similarly placed;
- ASEAN-centred institutions,
- Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
- Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping for pursuing political and security interests.

These engagements in multiple forums for varying economic, political and security purposes have, as

argued by Shashi Tharoor, made the Non-Aligned Movement “largely incidental” to India’s pursuit of its national interest since the end of the Cold War. This view suggests that the idea of nonalignment remains relevant in terms of strategic autonomy and has increasingly expressed in terms of multi-alignment. The NAM, on the other hand needs to reinvent or reorient itself to remain relevant. This provides India both an opportunity and challenge.

### **III. Reasons for Non-Alignment**

India had adopted the policy of non-alignment as it did not want to lose its freedom of decision-making, and because India’s primary concern soon after independence was economic development. The policy has been sustained for five decades. Professor M.S. Rajan had mentioned seven reasons for adopting this policy initially.

- Firstly, it was felt that India’s alignment with either the US or the USSR bloc would aggravate international tension, rather than promote international peace. Besides, the Indian Government left later than in view of size, geopolitical importance and contribution to civilization, India had “a positive role to play in reducing international tension, promoting peace and serving as a bridge between the two camps.”
- Secondly, India was neither a great power, nor could she allow herself to be treated as a nation of no consequence. India was, however, potentially a great power. Non-alignment suited India’s “present needs to keep out national identity” and on the other hand not to compromise “our future role of an acknowledged Great Power.”
- Thirdly, India could not join either of the power blocs because of emotional and ideological reasons. We could not join the Western (American) Bloc because many of its member countries were colonial powers or ex-colonial powers, and some still practiced racial discrimination. We could not join the Eastern (Soviet) Bloc because communism, as an ideology, was completely alien to Indian thinking and way of life.
- Fourthly, like any sovereign country, India, who had just become sovereign, wanted to retain and exercise independence of judgement, and not to “be tied to the apron-strings of another